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Daniel Dennett is among the most preeminent and influential living philosophers, and 
his book, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, encapsulates several of his ma-
jor contributions to the field, his approach to philosophy and other domains of inquiry, 
and his account of the role of philosophy in human intellectual endeavors.  The book is 
written for a curious and attentive lay audience; Dennett takes himself to be instructing 
the reader in the use of tools for thinking that he has found particularly helpful, using 
examples—case studies in thinking about difficult problems—from philosophy and sci-
ence to demonstrate the operation of these thinking tools.  He is largely successful in this 
aim, introducing and deftly wielding a number of conceptual tools that are both broadly 
applicable and important, while at the same time giving concise presentations of several 
loci of discussion and inquiry in the philosophy of mind and science.
In Dennett’s presentation of his project, he cites the autobiographical work of Richard 
Feynman—Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman, and What Do You Care What Other People 
Think?—as a primary influence (Feynman & Leighton, 2010, 2011).  Dennett writes, 
“I decided to try my own hand at a similar project, less autobiographical and with the 
ambitious goal of persuading you to think about these topics my way” (3).  While it is 
true that autobiographical anecdotes and sketches figure only minimally throughout, the 
philosophical ground covered and the approaches offered are markedly characteristic of 
the author; the reader familiar with Dennett’s work will recognize themes and arguments 
in nearly every chapter.  The book thus serves nicely as an introduction to his thought 
and work, while at the same time introducing a number of topics of philosophic and sci-
entific investigation, and also providing tools, notions, and patterns of reasoning—good 
and bad—that Dennett takes to be widely applicable in human life and inquiry.
This is an ambitious collection of goals to attain in 450 pages, even given Dennett’s admi-
rable gift for incisive yet conversational analysis.  Dennett writes, “I have always figured 
that if I can’t explain something I’m doing to a group of bright undergraduates, I don’t 
really understand it myself, and that challenge has shaped everything I have written” 
(12).  There is something importantly right about this; anyone who teaches has, at some 
point, recognized deep interconnections between understanding and explanation.  The 
book usually reads as though this bright undergraduate, interested in philosophy and 
in Dennett’s positions but without particularly extensive background in either, is the 
intended reader.  However, there are also numerous discussions throughout that non-
undergraduate readers—be they researchers in other disciplines, philosophers in other 
areas, or specialists in philosophy of mind or cognitive science—will find illuminating.
The book can be usefully divided into five main parts.  The first is an introduction to 
several thinking tools and practices that are widely applicable, across varied contexts. 
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After these are introduced, Dennett goes on to discuss four particular cases—difficult 
topics and collections of discussions that provide the opportunity to introduce more 
tools, talking through intuition pumps, and wielding those thinking tools already intro-
duced.  These topics are, in order, Meaning, Evolution, Consciousness, and Free Will. 
Each of these discussions is rich with insights about the matter at hand, about how to do 
philosophy, and about how to think, and each deserves consideration.
Dennett devotes the first section of the book to general thinking tools that he has found 
helpful in a number of contexts.  Some recent compendia of philosophical tools may 
come to the reader’s mind by way of comparison.  To name two, Baggini and Fosl’s Phi-
losopher’s Toolkit (Baggini & Fosl, 2011) or Papineau’s Philosophical Devices (Papineau, 
2012).  Although these primarily aim at philosophers in particular, each also includes 
helpful tools for any thinker.  Sustained and accessible analyses of broadly applicable 
concepts—such as Frankfurt’s On Bullshit (Frankfurt, 2009)—can and do also contribute 
to the cause of philosophers offering every thinker some of the clarifying tools that have 
been developed in philosophy.  Initiating the pattern that will then be followed through-
out the later sections of the book, some of these principles and fallacies Dennett offers 
have been long known to philosophers but given a Dennettian gloss.  Others are those 
that he has borrowed and adapted from other thinkers, and a few are more or less origi-
nal inventions.  This work—offering patterns of reasoning that may help almost anyone 
think more clearly and effectively about difficult topics—is work that philosophers are 
too often guilty of having unduly neglected.  The world includes altogether too much 
muddled thinking, and philosophers, at least in theory, are among those best poised to 
help clear away these muddles.
The very first offering is a sort of panegyric of mistakes.  Dennett seeks to demonstrate 
how important it is to err, in life, in nature, and in philosophy.  Introducing a theme 
that is to recur throughout the book, Dennett writes, “The chief trick to making good 
mistakes is not to hide them—especially not from yourself.  Instead of turning away in 
denial when you make a mistake, you should become a connoisseur of your own mis-
takes, turning them over in your mind as if they were works of art, which in a way they 
are” (22).  Dennett convincingly connects this importance of error with both the study 
of the history of philosophy (so that we can learn from “very smart people making very 
tempting mistakes”) and the success of trial-and-error in natural selection and science. 
He is right that the importance of understanding our mistakes as such, and being willing 
to move forward knowing both that we have erred and that we will err again, can hardly 
be overstated.  Also concerned with what philosophy has to offer the thinking person, 
Russell articulated this sentiment, writing, “To teach how to live without certainty, and 
yet without being paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in 
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our age, can still do for those who study it” (Russell, 2013, p. 14).  Dennett’s meditation 
on mistakes may help us to go forward in Russell’s spirit, balancing somewhere between 
certainty and hesitation, but his exhortations sometimes sound a more positivist timbre 
than is in keeping with so modest a tone.  For example, Dennett commends Wolfgang 
Pauli’s contempt for a colleague who was “not even wrong”, apparently countenancing 
only errors of the false variety.  Another philosopher concerned with the application of 
philosophy to human life, Iris Murdoch, wrote a dialogue in which her character Socrates 
says: “Remember, you are doing philosophy—and sometimes when you’ve been trying 
really hard to get a glimpse of an idea you can only talk about it in a kind of nonsense. 
So stop trying to be clear and just talk honest nonsense” (Murdoch, 1999, p. 472).  It is at 
times unclear whether the honest nonsense that Murdoch’s Socrates propounds (and to 
my mind, rightly) counts among the varieties of error Dennett condones.
One familiar general principle that Dennett does an excellent job of presenting in this 
first section is what sometimes goes by the name ‘charitable interpretation’.  Rather than 
tackling this under one heading, he articulates three specific phenomena to be mindful 
of when interpreting the work or arguments of others.  First, he instructs the reader how 
to aim to use reductio ad absurdum without making a parody of the target.  Second, he 
offers a list of rules for presenting your opponent’s argument.  Third, he urges the reader 
to remember that there is much mediocre work to be had, and it is up to each of us to ad-
dress (and to try to refute) only the best.  Dennett’s presentation of reductios and avoid-
ing parody is perfectly satisfactory, but it is his rules for interpretation that really shine. 
Dennett adapts these rules from game theorist Anatole Rapaport, and hence calls them 
‘Rapaport’s Rules’ (33-34):
1. You should attempt to re-express your target’s position so clearly, vividly, and 
fairly that your target says, “Thanks, I wish I’d thought of putting it that way.”
2. You should list any points of agreement (especially if they are not matters of gen-
eral or widespread agreement).
3. You should mention anything you have learned from your target.
4. Only then are you permitted to say so much as a word of rebuttal or criticism.
It is hard to imagine the extent of the transformative effects these rules could have on our 
discourses—as philosophers and as human beings—if they were widely followed.  Straw 
person fallacies abound, both inside and outside academic circles, and they are most 
common when the stakes are highest.  In decades of paying attention, I have literally 
never heard any politician, from any party or nation, characterize their opponents’ views 
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without committing a straw person.  I have seldom heard this even from laypersons, 
characterizing those political views with which they disagree.  If we are interested in us-
ing reason to make the world and our understanding of it better—and we ought to be so 
interested—then a good first step is the strict application of Rapaport’s Rules.
Another aspect of selection and interpretation that Dennett wants to draw our attention 
to is what he calls “Sturgeon’s Law”, after the science fiction author Ted Sturgeon, from 
whom he borrows and adapts this dictum.  In Dennett’s words, Sturgeon’s law is simply 
that “Ninety percent of everything is crap” (36).  That is, any target domain—from televi-
sion shows to theology, and certainly including philosophy—includes plenty of material 
that rates mediocre at best.  “Let’s stipulate at the outset,” Dennett continues, “that there 
is a great deal of deplorable, stupid, second-rate stuff out there, of all sorts.”  To charac-
terize the whole of anything by reference to its lesser instances is misguided, and if we 
ever find ourselves saying “the whole of X is stupid”, we ought to pause.  Dennett is right 
to point out these dangers, and “Sturgeon’s Law” provides an effective rejoinder to any 
pronouncement of universal stupidity.  This goes for the work of philosophers as well, 
as Dennett points out in a lesson any newcomer (and many non-newcomers) would do 
well to learn.
The very best theories and analyses of any philosopher, from the greatest, most 
perceptive sages of ancient Greece to the intellectual heroes of the recent past 
(Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Dewey, Jean Paul Sartre—to 
name four very different thinkers), can be made to look like utter idiocy—or 
tedious nitpicking—with a few deft tweaks.  Yuck, yuck.  Don’t do it.  The only 
one you’ll discredit is yourself ” (37).
In both of these cases, the stated importance of owning mistakes, and the stated impor-
tance of interpreting charitably, however, it is not always clear that Dennett follows his 
own rules.  Indeed, he explicitly (and wisely) admits that he often struggles to apply Ra-
paport’s rules, and in the course of the book there are interpretations that fail to be chari-
table.  For example, when Dennett is characterizing the argument in favor of zombies, in 
the section that addresses consciousness, he describes the way that we might think that 
we already know that a person is conscious, from our interactions with them, and then 
goes on to write:
Some philosophers think that your imagination would be playing a trick on 
you if you fell for this “merely behavioral evidence of consciousness and jumped 
to that conclusion.  “Don’t fall, don’t jump!” might be their motto (284).
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However, Dennett grants elsewhere that even according to the zombie theorist, such a 
lack of consciousness might be nomologically impossible even if it were logically pos-
sible.  If this is so, then it must violate Rapaport’s first rule to present the view as though 
anyone who takes philosophical zombies to show something about consciousness also 
thinks that to ascribe consciousness to others is to fall for a trick.  As it happens, I tend 
to be sympathetic to Dennett’s ultimate position with respect to zombies—I think he is 
right that this is a basically confused, albeit tempting, notion, and I sometimes borrow 
Dennett’s arguments to show this—but I also suspect that the pro-zombie philosophers 
of mind among us would not respond to the above characterization with, “thanks, I wish 
I’d thought of putting it that way.”  If zombies were logically but not nomologically pos-
sible, acceptance of the qualia of others would be no more egregious an inference than 
any other that is grounded in the nomological character of the world.  Uncharitable 
moments such as this make at least occasional appearances throughout the book, and al-
though, in keeping with his exhortation to do so, Dennett does present some of his own 
past mistakes, he not infrequently seems keener to present the mistakes of those with 
whom he has disagreed.  Perhaps shortcomings such as these are all but unavoidable.
For the most part, Dennett articulately and convincingly makes the case that these gen-
eral thinking tools are valuable and graspable.  Although in some cases his injunctions 
fall flat—his two-page crusade against uses of the term ‘surely’ (53-54) can come off as 
overwrought (surely this term isn’t universally a sign of unreasoned bluster)—in others 
the warnings he gives about common pitfalls are important and clearly sounded.  At one 
point Dennett coins the term ‘deepity’ to denote a statement that gives the impression of 
wisdom or profundity, but only by virtue of its ambiguity (56-57).  Once the statement is 
pressed for clarity, the apparent wisdom disappears.  From the vague utterances of poli-
ticians to the platitudes of self-help books, shallow, ambiguous claims are all too often 
accepted as true and important, and curing these and similar ills should be the special 
province of the philosopher.
After the initial section introducing general thinking tools more are introduced, by way 
of sketches of some of the main questions and positions in four areas of philosophical 
inquiry.  The first of these sections, and the longest, offers tools for thinking about mean-
ing and content.  This case study is the most developed, and serves as a nice introduction 
to one of Dennett’s main offerings—the titular “intuition pumps” themselves—but is 
also perhaps the least effective as an introduction to philosophical discussions about the 
topic in question.
‘Intuition pump’ is a term coined by Dennett in his 1980 response to Searle (D. Dennett, 
1980).  These are thought experiments that are designed to illuminate and amplify a par-
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ticular intuition about difficult cases.  Dennett’s original example of an intuition pump is 
Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment, which he again deftly addresses later, in the 
section on consciousness.  In the section on meaning, it is Dennett’s overarching aim to 
motivate a broadly Quinean, roughly deflationary, interpretationist view of intentional-
ity, convincing the reader that “meaning isn’t going to turn out to be a simple property 
that maps easily onto brains, and we’re not going to find “deeper” facts anywhere that just 
settle the question of what a sentence, or a thought, or a belief really means” (197).  It is 
not that Dennett’s arguments in this section fail—on the contrary, I find myself mostly 
convinced—but rather that his audience blurs.  Philosophy of language is a notoriously 
difficult subject for an introductory audience to approach, and unless Dennett’s “bright 
undergraduates” are already fairly well versed and motivated in this area in particular, 
even the more than one hundred pages Dennett spends on meaning will probably fail 
to bring them up to speed.  Conversely, much of the argumentation and considerations 
herein are too familiar to be persuasive to any professional philosopher who is not al-
ready basically in agreement.  As a treatise on meaning and the right way to frame it, this 
section has something of a difficult time finding its audience.
This being said, the section on meaning still includes, along the way, a number of il-
luminating discussions and helpful tools, which means that it is a success by most of 
Dennett’s own lights.  His brief expositions of a Quinian holism about belief (65-68) are 
impressively perspicacious and accessible; these make good use of what he introduces as 
the ‘sorta’ operator, as he insists that the only answer to whether a very young child really 
believes that her daddy is a doctor is that she sorta believes this—and theoretical per-
spective that forces us to draw a bright line that divides whole beliefs from non-beliefs 
must be flawed.  His concise introductions of the distinction between the manifest and 
scientific images (69-72), and of folk psychology (73-76), are as effective as any of the 
lengthier versions of these to be found in introductory philosophy of science and phi-
losophy of mind texts.  His use and presentation of a crossword with two equally good 
solutions (176) is a brief, brilliant, efficacious introduction to the concept (and some of 
the consequences) of indeterminacy.
In the middle of this long section on meaning, Dennett strays into a forty-page inter-
lude on computers and computing (107-150).  Although it may try the patience of some 
among his audience, this interlude could stand on its own as an important reading in a 
theoretical computer science course, or a course on artificial intelligence, and any reader 
willing to patiently work through his use of register machines (which lead up to an ex-
planation of Turing machines), his presentations of conditional branching, virtual ma-
chines, and algorithms will find themselves in possession of a more whole and sharp 
grasp of the basics of computing.  These do contribute to his later discussions of meaning 
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and consciousness—especially through the graded mindlessness he claims is available on 
these bases—but the sudden shift to theoretical computer science does not do anything 
to help the confusion about the intended reader that this part of the book already bears.
The next three sections, on evolution, consciousness, and free will, are shorter, only sum-
ming in total to about the same number of pages as the previous section on meaning. 
While evolution is the least orthodox of these as a subject of philosophical inquiry, Den-
nett does nice work using discussions of evolution to highlight several philosophical 
tools and ideas.  He also, in this section, treats evolution itself philosophically, examining 
how thought experiments and intuition pumps can accelerate or impede our acceptance 
of evolutionary explanations.
One of the impediments to understanding evolutionary explanations is that evolution 
deals in such alien scales.  This is true of many things; easily conceivable scales of time 
and space occupy only a narrow margin among the possibilities.  In order to lend credi-
bility, comprehensibility, to these vast and vanishing probabilities, durations, and spaces, 
Dennett borrows the Library of Babel from Jorge Luis Borges (Borges, 1964).  Borges’ 
beautiful descriptions of the library of all possible books—which are already philosophi-
cal in tone—are borrowed by Dennett as a metaphor for every possible genetic combina-
tion (205-213).  This conceit is effective in its aim, but more importantly the imagery is 
used to make otherwise incomprehensible quantities, scales, and probabilities compre-
hensible.
Another nicely crafted use of a philosophical distinction (and once more, a distinction 
which is characteristic of Dennett’s work) is Dennett’s emphasis, in the course of explain-
ing evolutionary explanations, on the difference between competence and comprehen-
sion.  Citing the notorious prime-number year cycles of cicadas, Dennett makes a good 
case that the primeness of these numbers figure into reasons for the cicadas’ behaviors, 
even though the cicadas remain starkly unaware of said reasons (236-237).  Even in the 
absence of any reasoners, these reasons would remain, argues Dennett.  Darwin, for 
Dennett, gave us grounds for teleological explanations, rather than eliminating the need 
for these, and Dennett’s use of uncomprehending but competent behaviors, like those of 
the cicadas, make a good case for this.
One last discussion in this section worthy of mention is Dennett’s presentation of “Mito-
chondrial Eve” as a helpful way to think about both speciation and retrospective ascrip-
tion (247-251).  In a sort of Anscombian, Davidsonian twist, whether a new species has 
begun is a fact that can only be established in retrospect.  After all, any one of us, under 
the right circumstances, could be the forbear to what comes to be understood as a new 
O’Loughlin | Review:  Intuition Pumps
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1587 | 9
species, just as any female human who is an ancestor of any living human (and who is 
also not earlier than the present mitochondrial eve) could, by virtue of just the right 
happenstance deaths in the present, become the mitochondrial eve herself—that is, the 
most recent woman who is a direct ancestor to all living humans.  Dennett astutely talks 
the reader through these retrospective ascriptions—indeed, the reader is left wonder-
ing whether there is not more to say here, whether the kind of mid-range ontological 
robustness these ascriptions are purported to confer could not be used fruitfully in ac-
tion theory, or in questions of moral responsibility.  Whether or not someone has been 
dishonest, for example, may in some cases be defeasible in time in the same way that 
someone’s status as mitochondrial eve is defeasible in time, if intentions, like ancestry, 
can only be properly read diachronically.
In the section on consciousness, Dennett employs several familiar arguments.  As stated 
above he argues against Searle by “turning the knobs” on the intuition pump that is the 
Chinese room, trying to establish the truth of something like the systems reply, and he 
also argues against the “zombic hunch” (which he admits that he can feel, but tries to 
suppress) by stretching and investigating the notion that anything at all could really be 
behaviorally indistinguishable from us but lack qualia.  These discussions provide clear 
introductions to Dennett’s thought, and on matters that have been central to his interest 
and influence as a philosopher, for any reader seeking these.  They also provide conver-
sational introductions to the topic of qualia itself, and to some of the main points in the 
surrounding literature.  For those readers already familiar with Dennett’s work, much, 
but not all, of the consciousness section will be readily recognizable, but even so, several 
discussions present Dennett’s mature summaries of these ideas in clear and convincing 
terms.
One such section is Dennett’s discussion of the self (333-340).  Dennett conceives of the 
self as “the center of narrative gravity.”  That is, the way that a center of mass is a theorist’s 
fiction, but also a theorist’s fiction which genuinely helps to explain the phenomena of 
the world, is just the way that the self, as an organizing center point of our experience, 
is at the same time a genuine part of the world and also a fiction.  This is a position that 
Dennett has taken before, and that he has carefully revised and crafted over several de-
cades (D. C. Dennett, 1989, 1992).  This latest rendition, however, is markedly clear and 
persuasive.  Dennett starts from a Humean absence of self, and then asks the reader to 
consider the ways that when it comes to fictions, some usually straightforward questions 
may simply be misguided (whether, for example, Sherlock Holmes is taller or shorter 
than the conductor on the train to Aldershot).  In this same sense, he argues, we do not 
ask what a center of mass is made of, and we ought not ask where the self is located.  The 
self, for Dennett, is a theorist’s fiction, “posited in order to unify and make sense of an 
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otherwise bafflingly complex collection of actions, utterances, fidgets, complaints, prom-
ises, and so forth, that make up a person” (336).  Dennett is clear that this posit plays an 
important role in our understanding and explanations of the world:
It may be a theorist’s fiction, but it is a very valuable fiction from which a lot 
of true predictions can be generated.  Can such an abstract entity, having no 
material existence, actually cause anything?  Not directly, but explanations that 
cite a center of gravity compete with explanations that are clearly causal.  Why 
didn’t the coffee mug tip over when the sailboat heeled so drastically? “Because 
it has an unusually low center of gravity” competes with “Because it is glued to 
the deck” (335).
The perspicacity and succinctness with which Dennett delivers this intersection of com-
plex notions—prediction, understanding, causation, explanation—is characteristic of 
many of the better moments in his book.  Moreover, the apparent simplicity of his ex-
planations is clearly driven by serious and honed philosophical consideration.  Some of 
the brief considerations he offers, seemingly in passing, sketch deep-rooted arguments. 
Elsewhere in the same section, Dennett asks the reader to consider the difference be-
tween a question like “Have you ever been to Paris?” and a question like “have you ever 
broken a white coffee mug?”  We know the answer to the former immediately, and it 
seems almost unfathomable that anyone would hesitate in this.  The latter, however, may 
even be hopelessly unanswerable (and interestingly, it once more seems somewhat alien 
to imagine someone answering this immediately).  Dennett argues that this difference 
lies in the narrative nature of self: we shed those experiences that fail to be important to 
our narrative, and retain those that succeed.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how any theory of the self that is not grounded in narrative 
could account for these differences.  This is especially so since we can imagine world that 
supported the opposite reactions to these questions.  Even in this world, perhaps, we can 
imagine someone growing up on the outskirts of Paris, near its municipal boundary, but 
being raised by parents who engendered a particular reverence for white coffee mugs.  In 
such a case, someone might turn out to hesitate at the first question but answer the sec-
ond immediately—even in the negative.  If this is so, then it is not any intrinsic proper-
ties of these experiences that informs their status as available elements of autobiography, 
but rather the role they have played in the stories that we tell ourselves and others.
Dennett’s last case study is a relatively short, but effective and illuminating discussion of 
free will.  This is perhaps the most successful of the four case study discussions, given his 
aims regarding talking the bright undergraduate reader through a difficult topic while at 
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the same time demonstrating the use of careful, philosophical thinking.  He builds a case 
for compatibilism, utilizing several of the distinctions he has already introduced: be-
tween causes and reasons, between personal and subpersonal explanations, and between 
intentional and design stances.  Although such a discussion could easily descend into 
being too technical for an introductory reader or too simplified to be of interest to the 
veteran philosopher, Dennett’s treatment avoids both.  He argues adroitly, using analo-
gies from chess-playing programs, that there is an important sense in which statements 
about what could have happened, even where strictly speaking the system is determin-
istic, can be true or false.
To motivate this argument, Dennett spends several pages discussing Conway’s Game of 
Life (359-369), and the way that a simple and fully determined system can lend itself to 
various and real levels of description, as well as to genuinely unexpected discoveries and 
inventions.  Despite the fact that any given Life world already contains its entire future in 
its initial position and deterministic (and very simple) laws, there are levels of descrip-
tion at which “marvelous and unanticipated” things happen.  There are high-level, robust 
patterns that can bear the weight of counterfactual claims.  This allows us to say of one 
sophisticated chess program that it may have castled instead—because there are similar 
situations in which that very program would have castled—but to deny that of some less 
sophisticated program, which in no similar cases would have done so.  Together, these 
provide a basic defense of compatibilism.
In general, Dennett’s book is a success.  There are discussions and tools that will be help-
ful to the bright undergraduate who is interested in philosophical topics like conscious-
ness and free will.  There are passages and presentations that will be helpful to the phi-
losopher who is seeking to be better acquainted with Dennett’s arguments and methods. 
There are explanations and sketches that will be helpful to the non-philosopher specialist 
who is interested to better understand how philosophical approaches are brought to bear 
on these interdisciplinary topics.  Perhaps miraculously, there are sometimes sections 
that manage to be all three of these things at once.  Most importantly, perhaps, these 
discussions set a precedent that is important for philosophers to bear in mind: much of 
what we do, as philosophers, is supposed to concern thinking clearly about difficult top-
ics.  We take our field, and the skills it cultivates, to be broadly applicable in the world. 
Thinking clearly about difficult topics is something that is not always done well, and 
Dennett is right to want to articulate the tools that he has used, and continues to use, in 
the hopes that readers might apply them to a wide array of tasks, problems, and discus-
sions, inside and outside philosophy.  Philosophers are well positioned for this work, 
and Dennett’s book is a welcome example.  Anyone who has spent a lifetime learning to 
think through difficult topics should have something to share with those of us who are 
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still trying to think through difficult topics—which is everybody—and perhaps the best 
way to share this, like Feynman (or for that matter Proust, or Montaigne), is to lead the 
reader through those very thickets that formed the writer’s own path.  Dennett should 
be commended for doing just this, and for doing it with characteristic spirit and clarity.
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